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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to provide an impact analysis of
the macroeconomic consequences of the employment subsidization
programs in Turkey implemented under the post-2008 crisis period.
To this end, an applied general equilibriummodel (of the computable
general equilibrium – CGE variety) is utilized to investigate the
production, incomesgeneration, andaggregatedemandcomponents
of the domestic economy. The analysis highlights the rather limited
returns to the subsidization package, and argues thatmuch of thiswas
due to the dis-equilibriating and fragile macroeconomic environment
under the neoliberal policy framework. The massive drop of domestic
savings; a severe mis-alignment in the real exchange rate causing
significant appreciation of the domestic currency; rise of the external
deficit and of foreign indebtedness alongwith a severe fall in the total
productivity effort were different facets of this poor macroeconomic
performance. Thus, an importantmessage of the study is that, had the
macroeconomicbalancesweremaintainedat their historical averages,
and a more competitive exchange rate could have been pursued,
as much as threefolds of a gain in aggregate employment could
have been generated with the same intensity of the employment
subsidizationpackage, in comparison to thehistorically realized levels.
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1. Introduction
The global economy is under crisis since 2007. Over the course of the last eight years,
the crisis had revealed itself under different sets of conditions over inflation in food and
primary commodity markets; excessive financial speculation and fragility, and massive
unemployment. According to ILO’s estimates, global unemployment has increased from
170 million in 2007–205 million in 2014 (International Labor Organization 2014). The
ILO further cautions that due to the recent slowdown in growth and the uncertain pace of
recovery, the world economy is to be able to create only half of the 80 million jobs needed
over the next two years to reach the pre-crisis employment rates. ILO’s baseline projections
report a likely increase in global unemployment up to 206 million in 2016, with about 65
million of the unemployed being young and 80 million women labor force.
Many countries introduced various programs to protect and promote their labor mar-
kets. Germany expanded its short-time work program (Messenger and Ghosheh 2013);
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Holland relied on its flexi-cure institutional structure; and many OECD members intro-
duced active labor programs, while the US reverted to monetary expansion (dubbed as
quantitative easing).
Turkey adopted a mix of general (covering all employees) and targeted (new hires,
vulnerable groups, young,women, etc.) subsidies under awide variety of programs, ranging
from employment incentives based on regional support to active labor programs targeted
to vulnerable groups. These were implemented mostly through reduced social security
contributions, and were financed mostly by the proceeds of the unemployment insurance
fund (UIF) and only partially by the Treasury. According to estimates, the aggregate
costs of these programs amounted to roughly 0.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP),
placing Turkey among the most aggressive subsidizing countries among the OECD. The
employment multiplier of such programs was estimated to be around 0.91 (Yeldan 2011,
2010; State Planning Organization 2010).
The main objective of this study is to provide an impact analysis on the efficiency
and macroeconomic consequences of the employment subsidization programs in Turkey
under the post-2008 crisis period. To this end, an applied general equilibriummodel (of the
computable general equilibrium – CGE variety) is utilized to investigate the production, in-
comes generation, and aggregate demand components of the domestic economy. Themain
strategy of the analytical approach is to assess the economic impact of the implemented
employment subsidy programs by raising the question of ‘what would have happened in
the absence of such programs?’ The (counter-factual) analysis rests on the deviations from
the historically observedmacroeconomic, sectorial and labor outcomes, and is carried over
2008–2013.
The distinguishing feature of the analytical approach is that the net impact analysis is not
confined to the labormarkets alone, but encompasses resolution of themacroeconomic ag-
gregates as well as the micro/sectorial outcomes. By utilizing the CGE apparatus as a social
sciences laboratory, I extend the analysis to cover both the inter-sectoral and the inter-
temporal effects of the implemented employment subsidy programs on domestic resource
allocation, (functional) income distribution, and fiscal, as well as external balances.
There is a wide spectrum of views and much disagreement on the efficacy and the
net overall impact of such programs in the literature (see e.g. Betcherman, Daysal, and
Pagés 2010; Card, Kluve, andWeber 2010; Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith 1999; Jespersen,
Munch, and Skipper 2008; Kluve 2010). Kluve (2010), for instance, notes that the effective-
ness of the programs rely mostly on the ‘program type’, rather than …‘contextual factors
such as labor market institutions or the business cycle’ (p. 904). In the Turkish context,
based on a difference-in-differences econometric exercise of counterfactual analysis, and
focusing on a select subset of the employment subsidization package, (Betcherman, Daysal,
and Pagés 2010) report that those programs led to significant gains in formal employment,
yet ‘the cost of job creation had been high due to the substantial deadweight losses’ (defined
by the authors as ‘the number of jobs that would have been created independently of
the subsidy programs’) (710, 711). A similar conclusion was reached independently by
Balkan, Soner Baskaya, and Tumen (2014) who, based on a similar methodology, found
that the estimates of the subsidy on targeted groups (youth and women) were statistically
insignificant revealing that ‘the program had a negligible impact’ (3). Ercan (2010) and
Yeldan (2013, 2010), based on their desk-study of the available data, report that the overall
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efficiency of the active labor programs complemented by the short-time work program in
2008/09 was limited, and had suffered from a high fiscal burden.
This study expands these results in two ways: first, due to its general equilibrium struc-
ture, it encompasses both the macro aggregate and the sectorial detail of the implemented
subsidization programs rather than focusing solely on the labor market results alone.
Second, and more importantly, given its analytical tractability of the inter-sectoral and
inter-temporal price signals and the corresponding commodity and resource flows, it
goes beyond the simple narration of the empirical findings, and enables us to analyze in
depth the adjustment mechanisms invigorated within an open economy macroeconomic
framework. The results corroborate with the previous findings highlighting the rather
limited returns to the subsidization package; and argue thatmuch of this was due to the dis-
equilibriating and fragilemacroeconomic environment surrounding the national economy
under the neoliberal era. The massive drop of domestic savings; a severe misalignment in
the real exchange rate causing significant appreciation of the domestic currency; rise of the
external deficit and of foreign indebtedness along with a severe fall in the total productivity
effort were different facets of this poor macroeconomic performance. Thus, an important
message of the study is that, had the macroeconomic balances were maintained at their
historical averages and a more competitive exchange rate could have been pursued, with
the same intensity of the employment subsidization package, as much as threefolds of a
gain in aggregate employment could have been generated in comparison to the historically
realized levels. These hypotheses mainly rest on the vision set forth in Rodrik (1992), in
that, themacroeconomic climate ultimately sets the course of efficacy of themicro/sectorial
reforms; and that much of the expected gains from micro level reforms hinge upon the
successful performance of themacroeconomic fundamentals at the background.
The remaining pages of the paper are organized in five additional sections. The following
section introduces the salient program features and the institutional background of the
subsidypackages. The analytical components of theCGEmodel are introduced in Section3,
and its historical tractability is presented in Section 4 along with a brief account of the
recent history of the Turkish economy. The counterfactual impact analysis is implemented
under four distinct scenarios in Section 5, while Section 6 summarizes and concludes. The
data-set of the CGE model is tabulated in a separate Appendix.
2. Main components of Turkey’s employment subsidization program
Turkey has been one of the hardest hit economies under the global crisis. The repercussions
were severe on the industrial sectors, in particular industrial employment.With a historical
collapse of the industrial real output by 24% in January 2009, and the aggregate GDP
by 14.9% in the first quarter of 2009, Turkish labor markets were faced with a severe
contraction in demand. Open unemployment ratio increased from an average of 9.5% in
2008 to a historical high of 16.1% in February 2009.
In response to the darkening economic conditions, the Turkish government enacted
a series of stimulus packages starting in the last quarter of 2008. The first employment
package was announced in October 2008 with mostly provisions for reductions in social
security premiums andother cost items for the employers. This packagewas complemented
in February 2009 where the short time employment program (reduced working time
program in the official Turkish jargon) was vitalized. Finally, a further package was
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announced in May of 2009 with a wider set of fiscal stimulus measures directed for
employment and aggregate demand.
The subsidization package was introduced and administered by the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security (MLSS) and Turkish Employment Agency (Iskur) which was
established in 2003. The MLSS had initiated a series of preparations in 2009 to bring
all existing employment incentive schemes under one unified program commensurate
with the newly invigorated National Employment Strategy (NES) document. The NES was
further introduced as a priority task within the Ninth Development Plan (2007–2013) and
was finally accepted as an independent strategy concept in 2014. The NES exclusively
underlined policies to enhance the education-skill acquisition and employment links, and
targeted to advance both the securitization and flexibility of the labor markets. It further
set the stage for specific targets and the subsidization policies to be implemented within an
overall macroeconomic framework. On a broader time horizon, it set specific quantified
targets for employment, unemployment and reductions of the unregistered (informal)
employment status. Accordingly, it was envisaged to reduce the open unemployment ratio
to 5%, increase the employment rate to 55%, and reduction of the informal employment
share to 15%.
2.1. The employment subsidization package
The first component of the subsidization package was the ‘Employment Subsidies for the
Development Priority Regions’ program. The program had a broader aim to promote
regional development and to reduce regional income disparities through tax and social
security premiumbreaks, subsidized land and credit allocations to foster fixed investments,
and energy utilization support. It targeted those enterprises that operate in the ‘developing
regions’ with a per capita income less than 1500$ and employ 10+ workers. Within the
program, 80% of the employer share of the social security premium was taken over by the
Treasury (100% if the enterprise were founded within an organized industrial park). It has
to be noted that the program addressed not only to the newly employed workers, but to all
employees that had been in employment. This feature wasmainly instrumental in bringing
an increase of 26% in the number of participating firms and of 271% in the number of
workers engaged over 2009–2012. The program was modified in 2013 and was extended
with the addition of a six percent further reduction in the social security premium for those
firms engaged in municipalities with the recognized development priority.
Yet, the most popular component of the subsidization measures was the so-called
‘5-point subsidization programme’. With this, 5% of the employer premium dues were
taken over by the Treasury for those firms that do not have any former debt on social
security commitments, irrespective of the status of regional development. It covered all
registered workers employed by the private sector enterprises that were not engaged in
sub-contracting. This last condition on eligibility was quite instrumental in expanding
the formal share of employment within the program. Like the previous one, this current
program was also targeted to all employees, existing as well as newly employed.
‘New’ employment was targeted under the ‘Programme on Subsidization of Woman
and Young Employment’ (Article no 4447). It covered women and young employment
(ages 18–29) and was available only to those new workers employed additionally over the
average number of employed in the previous month in question. It had a differentiated
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Table 1.Main components of the employment subsidization programs in Turkey.
Summary information Requirements for eligibility
5084 – Subsidization of municipalities
with development priority
Until 2012; 80% of employer share of
soc sec premiums met by the Treasury
(100% for OIRs)
Developing regions: per capita income
less than 1500$; for those firms with
10+ workers
6486 – Regional subsidization of
6 points of soc sec premium
After 2013, replaced 5084 Firms with 10+ workers
5510 – 5 point reduction in premiums For firms that have no SSA premium
debt; 5% of the employer premium
dues met by the Treasury
For registered workers only with no
previous debt to the SSA
6111 – Subsidization of occupation
sufficiency for women and young
For targeted workers with occupation
eligibility
Covers workers age 18 and above; for
those workers that had been additional
to the average no of employed of
the previous month; for firms with no
previous debt to the SSA
4447 – Subsidization of woman and
young emp
For young and women employed
01.01.2008–30.06.2009: employer
share of SSA premiums of 100% 1st
year; 80% 2nd; 60% 3rd; 40% 4th; 20%
5th year covered from the UIF
For ages 18–29 and women above 18;
available only to those new workers
employed in addition to the average no
of employed in the previous year, July
2007–June 2008
4857 – Subsidization of handicapped
labor
For firms tomeet the legal requirement
to have 3% of their employers as
handicapped, 100% of the relevant SSA
premium is met by the Treasury
Firms with 50+ workers
25510 – Subsidization of employers
with investment certificates
For firms under state guaranteed
investment support program, all SSA
premiums are covered by the Min
of Development; with duration of 2–
7 years of support, on average
For firms that hold certificate of
regional investment subsidization; with
a differentiated duration depending
on the region and sector. For those
workers that had been additional to
the average no of employed of the last
6months
5746 – R&D subsidization Introduced in 01.10.2008 for subsidiz-
ing R&D expenditures of firms
Avaiable up to 10% of R&D staff
premiums
5225 – Subsidization of cultural
investments
For firms with ‘certificate of cultural
investment’; 50% of SSA premium for
3 years; for firms with ‘certificate of
innovation’ 25% of SSA premium for
7 years are met by the Treasury
For registered workers only with no
previous debt to the SSA, for eligible
firms
5921 – Subsidization of unemployment
insurance premiums
Introduced 01.10.2009 for indefinitely;
1% of the short-term SSA premium
and all health insurance premiums are
met over the period of eligibility for
those firms who employ previously un-
employed workers who were receiving
unemployment insurance benefits
For those employees who were
unemployed and were receiving
unemployment insurance benefits; for
those workers that had been additional
to the average no of employed of
the last 6months; for firms with no
previous debt to the SSA
scale in granting reductions to the social security premiums. The subsidization package
further entailed elements to coverResearch andDevelopment (R&D) investments; to target
vulnerable groups and various other social objectives. The complete program is tabulated
and summarized in Table 1.
Table 2, in turn, summarizes the fiscal burden of the subsidization program across years
and its components. As can be seen, the ‘5-point reduction’ subsidy (Article no 5510)
comprised almost 90% of the fiscal costs of the overall package. The subsidization costs
were 3.5 billion TRY in 2009 and reached to 7.8 billion TRY in 2013. As a ratio to the GDP
these costs amounted to 0.38% in 2008, and to 0.5% in 2013, and were calculated to reach
between 2.04% (2008) and 2.32% (2013) of the aggregate fiscal expenditures of the general
government tax revenues.
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Table 2. Employment subsidy expenditures (millions TRL).
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
5510 – 5 point reduction in premiums 702.173 3324.801 4103.671 4784.004 5755.786 6893.790
6111 – Subsidization of occupation sufficiency
for women and young
– – – 122.168 352.363 516.697
5746 – R&D subsidization 13.959 49.506 70.700 97.541 97.056 108.582
4857 – Subsidization of handicapped labor 19.500 43.874 57.247 61.787 71.767 93.275
25510 – Subsidization of employers with
investment certificates
– – – 1.954 13.401 43.409
4447 – Subsidization ofwoman and young emp 14.095 60.441 103.511 48.054 19.913 8.497
5225 – Subsidization of cultural investments 0.103 0.063 0.254 0.560 0.694 0.845
5921 – Subsidization of unemployment
insurance premiums
– 0.004 0.223 0.079 0.259 0.373
5084 – Subsidization of municipalities with
development priority
717.630 741.280 925.920 1089.750 1263.060 –
6486 – Regional subsidization of 6 points
premium
– – – – – 84.804
Total 1467.461 4219.970 5261.525 6205.897 7574.298 7750.272
GDP (billion TRL) 950,534 952,559 1,098,799 1,297,713 1,416,798 1,565,181
General government tax revenues (billion TRL) 172,251 176,136 216,109 260,262 285,695 334,445
Total subsidy/GDP (%) 0.15 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.50
Total subsidy/gen gov. tax rev. (%) 0.85 2.40 2.43 2.38 2.65 2.32
3. Algebraic structure of the analytical model
The analyticalmodel distinguishes 13 sectors aggregated from the 2002 Input/Output (I/O)
statistics for Turkey. Each sector is assumed to operate via theworkings of a ‘representative’
firm which makes production and employment decisions. Each ‘firm’ employs physical
capital, and two categories of labor: informal (vulnerable), and formal labor. Informality of
the labor type is based on the ILO’s (International Labor Organization) conceptualization
as (1) unregistered employment that is not covered by any social security package; (2)
self-employed, and (3) unpaid family laborers.
Formal labor real wage rate is regarded exogenous and the formal labor market clears
via quantity adjustments on employment. Given labor demand by optimization over real
marginal productivity, and given exogenously set real wage rates, unemployed formal labor
is found endogenously. In the validation exercise of the historically realized path, the path
of unemployment is simulated closely to match historical data over 2009–2013.
Conceptualized on an abstract level, sectorial gross output, XS is produced by physical
capital, K, labor, L, and intermediate inputs. Output is marketed either domestically, DC,
or exported, E. Total absorption is DC plus imports, M, and is used as private and public
consumption, C and G, investment expenditures, I, and total intermediate input demand,
INT. The intermediate input demand is generated via Leontieff input–output coefficients.
Sectorial value added (XS − INT) on the other hand is obtained via a two-stage production
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology: in the top stage capital and labor
aggregate forms value added, V ; at a lower stage this labor aggregate is derived from the
CES composition of formal and vulnerable labor types. Balance of payments is maintained
via endogenous solutions of the real exchange rate, to mock the ‘flexible floating’ exchange
rate regime of Turkey.
Given this background, gross output is given by the following Leontieff technology
between value added and intermediates:
XSi = min
[
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Here value added, Vi, and intermediate input uses, ai,jXSi are aggregated together along
the fixed input–output Leontieff coefficients. Value added is found by aggregate labor, LA,






i + (1 − βi)KP−ρii
]−1/ρi
(2)
The aggregate labor is then composed of two types of labor, formal and vulnerable, both of
which are indispensable part of sectorial labor input and substitute each other inelastically
along a second CES functional,
LAi = Bi
[
γiLF−υii + (1 − γi)LI−υii
]−1/νi
(3)
As formal wage rate is exogenously fixed, unemployment is the end result of
UNEMP = LFS −
∑
LFDi (4)
where supply of formal labor is given and sectorial labor demands are based on marginal
productivity of formal labor. Factor incomes are channeled to the income pool of the
representative household. Social security premiums and other labor taxes are cut from the
formal wages and accrue to government’s fiscal income. Operating surplus of the ‘firms’,
likewise, is added to household income, along with other (exogenous) sources of income
via public transfers and remittances abroad.




LIDi + GtrHH + EtrHH + εROWtrHH (5)
In Equation (5) ε denotes the exchange rate, ROWtrHH denotes the exogenous flows of
remittances abroad, and EtrHH and GtrHH represent transfers from the enterprise sector
and the government. sstax is the tax rate on labor, inclusive of social security premiums. All
of these flows are set at their historically realized values throughout the policy simulations.
Operating surplus of the enterprises (total disposable income of the private enterprise
sector) is accounted by:
EtrHH = (1 − tk)
∑
RPi − EtrROW + rDDomDebtG − rFεForDebtE + εForBorE (6)
Here tk denotes the corporate tax rate on firm profits,
∑
RPi, EtrROW is profit transfers
to ROW, rD DomDebtG is interest income on government debt instruments held by the
enterprise sector, rFεForDebtE gives interest costs on foreign debt and εForBorE narrates
net new foreign borrowing by the corporate sector.
Government’s (public sector) revenues are total direct and indirect tax revenues, tariffs







tmiεPWi Mi + tK
∑
RPi + tYYHH + sstax
∑
WFLFD (7)
Here tni refers to (net) production taxes (subsidy if negative); tmi denotes the sectorial
tariff rate on imports; tY is direct taxes on household income; tK is corporate tax rate
on corporate profit; and the last term is total social security taxes on formal labor. In an
attempt to simulate the ‘contractionary’ fiscal policy stance of the period, themodel follows
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a prior rule to set the primary (non-interest) budget balance as a ratio to the GDP. Given
the primary balance target, the non-interest expenditures are then rationed. Government’s
consumption and transfer expenditures are set as policy ratios to the available non-interest
expenditures, andpublic investments,GINV, are treated residually tomaintain the primary
target rule. Thus government’s total consumption expenditures are defined as,
GOVCON = gcr · (GREV − rFεForDebtG − rDDomDebtG) (8)
with gcr serving as the policy induced aggregate consumption rate out of available fiscal
expenditure funds. The balance on total public expenditures and public revenues yield the
public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR).
PSBR = GREV − GCON − GINV − rFεForDebtG − rDDomDebtG − GtrHH (9)
PSBR is to be financed either through domestic (DomDebtG) or foreign (εForDebtG)
debt instruments.
3.1. Market equilibrium and dynamics
General equilibrium of the model economy is achieved by endogenous iterations on prices
and the real exchange rate to clear the commodity markets and the foreign exchange
market. The market for informal/vulnerable labor is also brought into balance by flexible
wages. The ‘low’ value of the real wage rate as determined in the informal labor market is
informative in conveying the extend of poverty among the vulnerable labor across sectors.
The formal labor market clears through excess supply giving rise to open unemployment.
In the commodity markets, aggregate sectorial absorption (CC = XS +M − E) is equal to
aggregate expenditures on private and public consumption, investment and intermediates
across sectors.
Overall macroeconomic equilibrium (saving–investment balance) is obtained by,
PSAV + GSAV + εCAdef = PINV + GINV (10)
InEquation (10)PSAV andGSAV give, respectively, private andpublic sector savings; CAdef
is the deficit on current account (foreign savings) and the right-hand variables are private
and public investment expenditures. The current account deficit is given by the difference
between export revenues, transfers from abroad and the sum of imports, enterprise profit






PWi Mi + EtrROW + rFForDebtEt + rFForDebtGt
]
(11)
This equation is solved by flexible movements of the (real) exchange rate.
The model is updated in its exogenous flows, parameters and the policy variables along
a dynamic path spanning the 2008–2013 history. Over this path first capital stocks are
expanded via accumulation of investments, and labor supplies are updated with their
historical realizations. All exogenous variables and parameters are set at their historically
realized magnitudes. In an attempt to ‘track’ the historical path of the macroeconomic
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aggregates, the sectorial total factor productivity (TFP) rates had been adjusted to mock
for the boom-and-bust cycles of the Turkish economy under the turbulent conditions of
the Great Recession.
On the determination of capital accumulation, the model distinguishes across private
sector behavior (based on the profit motive) vs. public sector’s policy priorities among
the sectors. The public sector allocates its investment (by destination) expenditures via its
priorities of strategic sectors. For the private sector, investment allocations are driven by
the rate of sectorial profitability. Based on the notion of Tobin’s q, the model first calculates
the deviations of the sectorial profit rates from the economy-wide average, and distributes
investment funds accordingly, with high profit sectors capturing a higher share of the
investment fund. To characterize these actions formally, we first define sectorial profit





i − wFLFDi − wILIDi
PKi Ki
(12)
Capital investment (by destination) coefficients, DKi, are then set via:






Here SPi give the share of sectorial profits in aggregate, rAVG is the economy-wide average
profit rate and μ is an elasticity parameter to set the ‘responsiveness’ of the investment
allocation coefficient to sectorial profit rate differences.
As a final step we will follow up the dynamics of debt accumulation. It is assumed
that a portion, gfborrat, of public sector borrowing requirement, PSBR, is financed by
foreign borrowing, and the rest gives way to domestic debt accumulation. Thus we have
the following rules of debt dynamics:
DomDebtt+1 = DomDebtt + DomBort
ForDebtGt+1 = ForDebtGt + ForBorGt
with DomBort = (1 − gfborrat)PSBR. Simiarly, private enterprise debt accumulates via,
ForDebtEt+1 = ForDebtEt + ForBorEt
The numérairé of the system is the exchange rate, ε.
4. The 2008–2013 realized path and its validation
4.1. Themain features of the realized path, 2008–2013
Our next step is to utilize the CGE framework to trace and then to analyze the nature
of the deviations from the historical path that the Turkish economy had followed over
2008–2013. With this exercise, we focus not only on the labor market outcomes, but will
also be able to study the overall resolution of the macroeconomic balances, domestic as
well as external equilibria.
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As known, the analyzed period covers a very volatile history referred to as ‘great
recession’ with a meager rate of growth and collapsing employment opportunities all
around the globe. The repercussions of this episode were felt deeply in Turkey via wild
swings with a collapse of the GDP by 4.8% in 2009, and then with the expansions of 9.2%
(2010) and 8.8% (2011) to be followed by the almost stagnant per capita growth rates in
2012 and 2013. Rate of unemployment increased to 14% in 2009 and then almost got stuck
at around the 9.5–10.0% range. (see Tables 3 and 4).
All of these were driven mostly by the speculative flows of hot money finance in closing
the external gap (current account deficit). Availability of external finance ultimately defined
the boundaries of growth and employment over this period. Years of widening current
account deficit (2010 and 2011) as much as it could have been financed by inflows of
short-term speculative capital were associated with a consumption-led boom. The savings
performance of the private sector, in fact, literally collapsed to below the 10% mark,
a fall by almost 15% points in comparison to the early 2000s. The collapse of private
savings and the associated rise in the current account deficit were the two facets of
the worsening macroeconomic fragility over this period. Negative real rates of interest
and overall domestic rate of exchange were especially important in conveying signals
toward exuberant consumption. The behavior of the real exchange rate (TRY/US$) is
summarized in Table 3, where it can be seen that in comparison to 2003 the Turkish Lira
had appreciated by 21% in 2010, and then maintained its level throughout the crisis. The
ongoingQuantitative Easing program in the US, outpouring cheap foreign liquidity in the
global asset markets meant an opportune moment for Turkey and the other emerging
market economies, fueling their consumption boom. The costs of this speculative-led
growth episode was stagnation of real value added in the import-competing industries
and the persistence of unemployment and informalization.
The sectorial composition of employment is a manifestation of these assessments. Of
the total increase in employment (4393 thousands) from 2003 to 2013; a quarter belonged
to agricultural employment (1002 thousands). Services absorbed 60% of this gain with
2660 thousands, while the share of construction was 400 thousands. Gains in industrial
employment was a meager 500 thousands over the course of five years (Table 4). The
alleged sustained expansion in agricultural employment, in particular, is enigmatic for a
middle-income developing country such as Turkey, with rapid urbanization and structural
transformation towards the urban sectors. Agricultural employment had fallen by about
2.5 million persons from 2002 to 2007; and contrasted against this trend, the sustained
increase in rural employment over the course of the great recession warrants deeper
questions, an issue that lies clearly beyond the scope of this paper. With construction
employment remaining roughly constant at around 1.2 millions, most of the remaining
labor surplus seems to have been absorbed by service sectors. Many researchers trace the
roots of fragmentation and informalization of the urban labor to this trend, where small-
scale services based on self-employment and family labor was mostly the observed norm
(see e.g. Agénor et al. 2007; Bahce et al. 2011; Demirhan et al. 2011; Ercan and Tansel 2006;
Independent Social Scientists Association 2011; Taymaz and Ozler 2005).
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Table 4. Components of the Turkish labor markets.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
15+ Civil population 50,772 51,686 52,541 53,593 54724 55,608 56,986 57,854
Civilian labor force 23,805 24,748 25,641 26,725 27,339 28,271 28,786 29,678
Total employment 21,194 21,277 22,594 24,110 24,821 25,524 25,933 26,621
Participation rate 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51
Open unemployed 2611 3471 3046 2615 2518 2747 2853 3057
Open unemployment rate (%) 11.0 14.0 11.9 9.8 9.2 9.7 9.9 10.3
Non-agricultural unemployment rate (%) 13.6 17.4 14.8 12.4 11.5 12.0 12.0 12.4
Vulnerable employmenta 10,770.68 10,972 11,467 12,008 11,630 11,428 – –
Vulnerable emp ratio (%) 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.45 – –
Employment by sectors
Agriculture 4621 4752 5084 5412 5301 5204 5470 5483
Industry 4537 4179 4615 4842 4903 5101 5316 5332
Construction 1238 1305 1434 1680 1717 1768 1912 1914
Services 10,208 10,380 10,725 11,332 12,016 12,528 13,235 13,891
a ‘Vulnerable employment’ according to the ILO definition: unregistered employment with no social security coverage +
self-employed + un-paid family labor.
Source: Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat), Household labor force surveys.
Figure 1. GDP real rate of growth.
4.2. Validation of the historical path
Now we turn to the analytical workings of our model. Our first task is to ensure that the
endogenous dynamic solutions of the analytical model trace the historically realized values
of macroeconomic aggregates and the labor markets. To accomplish this, the strategy to
purse was to calibrate the historically realized values of employment and to solve for wages
and the TFP rates endogenously. Among themacroeconomic variables themost important
one is surely the GDP and its components. As discussed above, the realization of the GDP
path both in real rates of growth and in nominal valuation had been on a volatile trend.
Nevertheless, the modeling exercise was quite satisfactory in tracking this volatile path
both in the real rates of growth and nominal levels. Figure 1 compares the simulated vs.
historical values of the real growth, while Figure 2 narrates the same comparison for the
nominal levels. Thus the model solutions are observed to successfully track not only the
real, but also the nominal values, taking account of the price effects.
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Figure 2. Nominal GDP (billion TRL, curr prices).
Figure 3. Total factor productivity in Turkey, 2000–2013.
The TFP path as obtained by the endogenous solutions of themodel offers us important
information regarding the productivity performance of the domestic economy. Estimates
of the historically realized rates of TFP growth were obtained from (Kolsuz and Erinc
Yeldan 2014). These estimates are contrasted against the model solutions and projections
beyond 2008 in Figure 3. As observed, TFP growth was quite rapid over 2002–2006, it was,
nevertheless, on a declining trend after 2006. Following the collapse of the rate of growth
of TFP during the 2009 global crisis, its performance was quite meager and volatile after
2010.
The model distinguishes a segmented structure in its characterization of the labor
markets. For the formal/registered labor market real wage rate is fixed and the market
clears via quantity adjustments, while the informal (vulnerable) labor market clears via
flexible wages. Simulated unemployment rates are narrated in Figure 4, while the aggregate
employment level is tracked in Figure 5. The model’s tracking ability is found satisfactory
over a period when the unemployment rate ranged between 9 and 14.5%. In Figure 6 the
share of formal employment in aggregate is displayed. As observed, the share of formal
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Figure 4. Unemployment rate.
Figure 5. Total employment (1000 persons).
employment has fallen during the 2009 crisis, and recovered thereafter to reach a 6%higher
value by 2013. This should be ascribed to the stimulus provided by the conditionalities of
the subsidization package, as noted in Section 2 above.
Themost important component of the validation exercise is themodel’s analytical ability
to track the fundamental savings – investment equilibrium (see Equation (10) above):
Private Savings + Public Savings – Investment Expenditures = Foreign Savings (Current
Account Balance)
The model’s algebraic setup sets the ratio of private and public savings to a given ratio
(marginal propensity to save) of their respective disposable incomes (solved
endogenously). Current account deficit is calibrated to the historical realized path and the
investment expenditures are then resolved endogenously. Itmust be noted at the outset that
there had been many inconsistencies in bringing together the aggregate macroeconomic
data, such as fiscal revenues/expenditures, foreign trade and external capital flows, as
derived from diverse sources. In order to maintain the fundamental macroeconomic
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Figure 6. Formal employment/total.
Figure 7. Investment exp./GDP.
equilibrium noted above, private consumption expenditures had to be set residually to
pick up the imbalances at the aggregate level. In what follows, the observed divergences
of the consumption path document the ‘size’ of such inconsistencies stemming from the
official national income accounting statistics. The set of Figure 7 through 10 portray the
resolution of this equilibrium where it can be seen that the model’s tracking ability of the
fundamental macro aggregates have been quite robust with deviations of only a maximum
of 2% points on the share of consumption expenditures in the overall GDP (Figures 8–10).
Another area of importance in our validation efforts is the behavior of sectorial alloca-
tion of employment. Patterns of sectorial employment are the end-result of the microeco-
nomic processes whose resolution depends upon the relative price signals. As portrayed in
Figures 4–6 the model’s simulated path captures patterns of aggregate employment quite
closely. In the next step, Figures 11 through 14 document the model solutions on sectorial
employment and contrast the results with the historically realized paths. As noted above
the most distinguishing characteristic of the sectorial patterns of employment over the
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Figure 8. Private savings/GDP.
Figure 9. Consumption exp./GDP.
post-2009 era was the expansion of agricultural employment. Agricultural employment
had increased by as much as 230 thousands even under the darkening conditions of the
economic crisis in 2009. This process had continued secularly during the course of the great
recession and reached to 1 million net new employment in agriculture by 2013. Industry,
on the other hand, initially shed labor in 2009, and then recovered gradually with a net
expansion of about 500 thousand workers in 2013 – contrasted to 2008. Services served
as an employment sink, with 2.7 millions new employees between 2008 and 2013 (Figures
12–14).
Model simulations can track the historical path of the share of agricultural employment
with a deviation of approximately 2%. In the non-agricultural sectors, industry and services
are found to over-shoot the historical shares; while that of construction falls behind by
around 2% points. Overall, the model’s sectorial employment results can be said to remain
within bounds of tolerance in their validation of the historical results. The observed
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Figure 10. Current account deficit/GDP.
Figure 11. Agricultural employment/total.
deviations, amounting to no more than 2% points, should be regarded normal for an
era with abrupt swings in economic activity and sudden shocks.
Armed with this background, I now turn to the conduct of ‘what if?’ scenarios.
5. Analysis of alternative policy environments
In this section, I follow up the counter-factual policy simulations characterizing alternative
policy environments. To this end, the model’s policy parameters and exogenous variables
are perturbed to generate new paths that serve as alternatives to the ‘base-path’ that
simulates the historical realizations over 2009–2013. Deviations with respect to the base-
path will provide us with a quantified assessment of the relative strengths of the alternative
policies to the historically implemented policy schemes.
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Figure 12. Industrial employment /total.
Figure 13. Construction employment/total.
5.1. Scenario 1: What would have happened if the subsidy package had not been
implemented, ceteris paribus?
Compiled data from the TurkStat’s Household Labor Force Surveys and fiscal accounts
reveal that the fiscal costs of the employment program were on the order of 0.4% as a ratio
to the GDP, hovering around 0.5% after 2011 (see Tables 2 above, and 5 below). Yeldan
(2010) estimates, which have also included the stimulus package granted to the banking
and the financial sectors, found that the overall stimulus package cost 2.4% as a ratio to
the GDP in 2010 and 2011. Balkan, Soner Baskaya, and Tumen (2014) who had focused
mostly on women and young employment with a different methodology, report the costs
of the relevant subsidization scheme to 0.35 to the GDP.
In this first scenario, we focus on the main question of this study: If the subsidization
package that amounted to 0.4–0.5%as a ratio to theGDPwerenot implemented, howwould
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Figure 14. Services Employment/total.
Figure 15. Gains in employment under the subsidization program (1000 persons).
theTurkishmacroeconomic environment and the labormarkets be affected from the global
crisis? Ifwe reverse the question: in comparison to ahypothetical policy environmentwhere
no subsidies were granted (Scenario 1), what were the gains in employment and economic
activity under the historical realizations between 2009 and 2013?
The scenario analysis is conducted by increasing the tax burden on the (formal) labor
market that aims at reversing the subsidized employment taxes. Results are narrated in
Table 5 and Figures 15 and 16.
Modeling results indicate that, had the subsidization package not been implemented,
total employmentwouldhave been21million 186 thousands in 2009, rather than21million
271 thousands, as was historically realized. Consequently, unemployment rate would have
been 0.4%points higher, reaching to 14.4%.Thismeans that the subsidization packages had
succeeded in protecting 91 thousand jobs in 2009. These gains are calculated to accumulate
after 2010 to reach 230 thousands new employment created due to the package. According
to the model simulations, under the Scenario 1, the unemployment rate would have been
10.5%, rather than 9.7% in 2013; and the share of formal employment in the aggregate
would have been 54.8%, rather than 55.2%. Parallel to these results, real rate of growth of
the GDP is calculated to be 3.7%, rather than 3.8% on average.
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Figure 16. Gains in GDP under the subsidization program (billion TRY, fixed 2008 prices).
Thus, themodel results suggest that the employment gains of the subsidization program
ranged between 0.4% (2009) and 0.9% (2013) along the historical path, with gains in real
GDP growth being quite marginal at about 0.1%.
These results corroborate with those analyses that had tackled the issue using different
methodologies (see Balkan, Soner Baskaya, and Tumen 2014; Duman 2014; Efendioglu
2010; Yeldan 2013; Yeldan 2010). Balkan et al. report, based on their econometric analysis
of differences of differences, that the impact of the woman and young employment subsidies
had been marginal on the targeted groups. Yeldan (2010), in turn, analyzed the subsidy
component of Turkey’s reduced work programme and found that the effectiveness of the
program in comparison to fiscal costs was quite marginal in generating employment gains,
and argued that the marginal costs of the reduced work program were among the highest
in the OECD countries that implemented similar measures. Thus, I argue that the overall
impact of the total subsidy programwas positive, yet quitemediocre.What could have been
themain structural reasons behind this outcome? and starting from this question, how could
the program be implemented instead to yield more effective results? These are the questions
that I tackle in the next section.
5.2. If themacroeconomic balances could have beenmaintained: Scenario 2
Answers to these questions rest on our working hypothesis that the boundaries of micro
sectorial policies are ultimately set by the overall macroeconomic environment they are
situated in. The period in question displays an era of wild swings in real production
and deepening fragilities for the Turkish economy. Among these were the (i) collapse of
the (private) savings; (ii) significant misalignment of the exchange rate with strong real
appreciation of the Lira; and as a consequence of these, (iii) significant deterioration of the
external balances along with massive foreign indebtedness. All these are to be recognized
as the major sources of deterioration of the fundamental balances and increased external
fragility for the Turkish macroeconomy.
These concerns are taken in further detail in Yeldan (2011), Independent Social Sci-
entists Association (2011) and Telli, Voyvoda, and Yeldan (2006). Appreciation of the
domestic currency, the Lira, under open economy conditions has, without surprise, led
to a widening trade gap and a consequent current account deficit. More importantly,
currency appreciation meant adverse conditions for the import competing industries and
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traditional exportables causing them to dwindle, while reduced import costs led to the
adoption of more (foreign) capital-intensive techniques with lower labor content, such as
automotives, auto spare parts, and consumer durables/electronics. As a result, thewidening
current account deficit meant not only increased fragility and disequilibria, but also lower
employment opportunities and foreign debt accumulation.
These developments gave way to a current account deficit of 78.1 billion US$ in 2011,
or about 9.7% as a ratio to the GDP. In order to evaluate the meaning of this figure, it
ought to be noted that Turkey has traditionally never been a ‘deficit prone’ economy.
On a historical standard, Turkey’s current account balance was typically maintained with
roughly a plus or negative current account balance of 0.5–1.5% as a ratio to the GDP. Thus,
the post-2009 deterioration of the current account balance along with the massive collapse
of the private savings performance were the main shocks to the macroeconomy. Breaking
with the long-term historical patterns for the Turkish economy.
Based on these observations I now forward this question: If the employment subsi-
dization program of 2008–2013 was implemented under a more balanced macroeconomic
environment where such fragilities had not existed, what would be its net outcome? We
can formulate the question in a more technical fashion as follows: If the domestic savings
were maintained at their historical averages of early 2000s at 18%; if the currency could
have kept its real level (with about 12–15% higher real depreciation over its historical
realization); and the current account deficit could be maintained at its 2009 level at 2.4%
(already high given historical standards), could the implemented subsidization packages
be more effective in generating higher employment?
Scenario 2 pursues these questions. The results of the scenario are displayed in Table 5.
In a nutshell, it is observed that under a more competitive real exchange administration
with a lower savings – investment gap (lower current account deficit), the subsidy program
would have generated an additional aggregate employment of 93 thousands in 2009, and
would reach to 337 thousands in 2013. This would mean an additional 568 thousand
employment return contrasted against the Scenario 1. Various channels can be cited to be
at work for explaining the adjustment mechanisms against the potential negative effects of
external imbalances on employment. First is the macroeconomic demand channel proper.
With the fall in net exports, national economy is expected to suffer from deflation in
aggregate demand at least in the short run. This Keynesian channel was also underlined in
the late history of the Latin American economies by Frenkel and Ros (2006) who report
that domestic production and employment had been substituted for external activity over
the externally fragile environment of the 1990s. This effect could further be reinforced with
the pressure of intermediate imports to lower the ratio of value added in gross output.With
the rise of the share of imported intermediates in gross production, domestic value added
falls, with adverse consequences on employment. This latter effect is revealed by Nucci
and Pizzolo (2010) in the context of currency appreciations. In their panel econometrics
work on Italian manufacturing firms, Nucci and Pizzolo report that the response of jobs
and hours worked to currency swings depends primarily on the firms’ exposure to foreign
sales and their reliance on imported inputs; with the degree of substitutability between
imported and other inputs playing a key role in the metrics of employment sensitivities.
A second channel can be envisaged to operate through the factor substitution effect. Rel-
ative cheapening of (imported) capital directs producers to substitute out labor, generating
pressures for a more capital-intensive input mix. A recent study on the TFP and revealed
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factor ratios of the post-1990 Turkish industry as conducted by Kolsuz and Erinc Yeldan
(2014) corroborate this prognostication. In their study of the estimates of (physical) capital
utilization in Turkish manufacturing over the 1990–2010 period, They report that capital
per labor had increased by more than twofolds in real terms.
Related to this one can conjecture a dynamic efficiency channel, wherein the long-term
accumulation and productivity rates are distorted with adverse effects on the speed of
generation of new jobs. The analytics of this route were formulated in a seminal paper
by Ros and Skott (1998) and were studied empirically in Frenkel and Ros (2006) in the
context of the Latin American economies. Determinants of dynamic efficiency and long
run growth extend, surely, beyond the balance of the external economy. Long run growth
is to be directly shaped by the position of the domestic economy in relation to the ladder
of the global value chains, and the dynamic shifts in the heterogeneous composition of
sectoral production play a key role in the resolution of the employment patterns. Aksoy
(2013) andMeschi, Taymaz, and Vivarelli (2011) report the positive feedbackmechanisms
of trade generation and skill upgrading due to export penetration and capital imports
with significant spillovers on skilled employment in Turkish manufacturing. In contrast,
Taymaz and Ozler (2005), Taymaz and Voyvoda (2009) and Taymaz, Voyvoda, and
Yılmaz (2008) caution on the strains of the ongoing substitution of skilled labor against
the traditional lines of employment and document the loss in jobs particularly in food
processing, textiles and mining and quarrying.
The mode of operation of these channels was not unidirectional, and necessitated
indirect links via the currency and product markets. Here the key variables are the
real exchange rate and the real rate of interest. A distinguishing feature of the Turkish
economy over the 2000s was the relatively high real rates of interest. Higher interest rates
together with a restrictive monetary stance were conducive in attracting capital inflows
and controlling for inflationary pressures. Yet, the negative effects of high interest rates
on employment are well-known (Nickell and Nicolitsas 1999). In the Turkish historical
context, high interest rates in the post-2001 era signified strong inflows of speculative
capital. It has to be recalled that the 2000’s was the era of great moderation together with
flexible (floating) exchange rate regimes, independent, inflation targeting central banks
with the objective of price stability and freely mobile capital flows. In return to all these,
Turkey witnessed severe appreciation of its currency, the Lira, over 2003–2008. The Lira
had appreciated by as much as 60% in real terms against the US dollar. The onset of great
recession in October of 2008 had caused depreciation of the TL somewhat, yet well short
of maintaining its real level of January, 1982 (Yeldan 2011).
It ought to be noted as well that, the determination of employment effects not only
the level, but also the volatility of the exchange rate matters. The potential negative
effects of exchange rate volatility are well known in the literature (see e.g. Andersen
and Sorensen 1988; Belke and Kaas 2004) and are succinctly documented in the Turkish
context in Demir (2010, 2013). In what follows, Belke andGocke (2004) further studied the
adverse effects of the revenue uncertainties on employment as generated by exchange rate
volatilities and accompanied current account balances in the context of a formal model
of risk-neutral firms facing sunk hiring and firing costs. In fact, the volatility and the
appreciation of currency together would necessarily result in adverse balance sheet effects
via the expectations channel. This is mostly due to the threat of expected depreciation
in the face of a widening current account deficit. Frenkel and Ros (2006) report of a
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statistically significant negative effect of currency appreciation on employment growth in
their study of the 17 Latin American economies; while Ribero et al. (2004) documents
the negative employment effects of real exchange rate appreciation in Brazil. Similarly,
Galindo, Izquierdo, and Montero (2007) show that, in response to worsening external
balances, the warranted currency depreciations are likely to generate negative employment
effects in regimes of high liability dollarization.
With amore balancedmacroeconomic environment, the Scenario 2 achieves an increase
in the real rate of growth of GDP by 0.1–0.2%, and leads to an expansion of the real
GDP by an additional 20 billion TRY (in fixed 2008 prices). More detailed assessments
reveal that the main source of this outcome lies with the expansion of export demand.
Under the scenario the GDP share of exports increase from 16.7% in 2013 (historical
realization) to 20.3%. This gain is mostly due to the stimulus generated via real exchange
rate depreciation. The scenario results further reveal that as a result of increased savings
funds, investment expenditures expand by 1 over their 2013 historical value. In this fashion,
capital accumulation is intensified and increases themarginal productivity of labor to serve
as the main catalyst in the rise of employment.
5.3. Selective employment subsidization that favor industrial employment:
Scenario 3
Our analysis thus far has treated the subsidization incentives as ‘neutral’ across sectors.
The fact that the results to the program were rather ‘dismal’ leads us to question whether
implementationof the subsidyprogram in amore selective fashion favoring labor-intensive
industry would produce better outcomes. Thus rather than implementing a signal rate
with neutral incentivization over all of the sectors in entirety, I introduce a pre-industrial
employment subsidy scheme under Scenario 3, and parametrically increase the subsidy
rate for the industrial sectors by twofolds.
The first panel of Table 6 summarizes the results of this exercise. It is found that
the additional (industrial) subsidies led to an additional gain in industrial employment
by 24 thousands in 2009, 29 thousands in 2010, and 53 thousands in 2011. By 2013
unemployment rate falls by about 0.2 percentage points, and a net expansion of 4 billion
TRY (in fixed 2008 prices) is achieved in real GDP.
In returns to a 1.5 billion TRY additional subsidy, the fact that the industry has created
additional jobs of only 53 thousands as of 2013, indicate that the employment generation
capacity of the sector is quite limited. This meager performance should ultimately be tied
with the rather low productivity of the industrial sectors. It is this issue I now turn upon.
5.4. The case of the productivity decline: Scenario 4
The post-2001Turkey had been an economyof boomand bust. Rapid expansions in output
(2004–2005; 2010–2011) were followed by slowdowns (2006–2008; 2012–2013) and severe
contractions (2009). This cycle was driven mostly by the availability of short-term foreign
capital inflows and ultimately found its disposal in the rate of TFP growth. Recent studies
on TFP estimation (Gursel and Soybilgen 2013; Kolsuz and Erinc Yeldan 2014 and Yeldan
et al. 2013) disclose that Turkey has attained fairly rapid TFP growth between 2002 and
2006, and yet it virtually stagnated following 2006. The global crisis has fallen over this
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Figure 17. Employment elasticity of the subsidiziation program under alternative scenarios (1000
persons/billion TRL).
decline in 2009 leading to a collapse of real output by 4.8%. Even though theGDP recovered
in 2010 and 2011, the economy failed to generate a sustained expansion in output driven
by productivity gains. Based on these observations, many researchers argued that Turkey
has been struggling with the constraints of themiddle income trap, a concept that has been
introduced in Eichengreen, Park, and Sin (2011).
Given our emphasis on the importance of maintaining the structural macroeconomic
fundamentals over the analyzed period, it would not be implausible to expect that an
export-oriented growth path with a balanced external account could produce a more
conducive environment for technological change and innovation. The links between
dynamic gains from innovation and technological change and a stable and competitive
macroeconomic environment is one of the key hypotheses of the new growth literature.
Thus, I would like to pursue this route by hypothesizing that the favorable conjuncture as
outlined in Scenario 2 above could have been complemented with TFP gains at the rate
as observed in Turkey over 2002–2006. Increased exports expanded capital investments
leading to increased productivity gains in labor are well expected to generate further gains
in total productivity creating a virtuous cycle of sustained growth. This favorable (but quite
realistic) expectation is what we simulate under Scenario 4.
Under these hypotheses, the scenario takes the balanced macroeconomic environment
of Scenario 2 and complements it with added gains inTFP at a rate of 0.5% after 2010.Given
the historical and simulated paths of the TFP over the 2000s as displayed in Figure 3 above,
the warranted rate of TFP growth ascribed in Scenario 4 should be regarded ‘modest’. In
fact, the Medium Term Program of the Ministry of Development sets the expected TFP
growth at 1% over 2014–2017; while the World Bank (2014) Report on Turkey assumes
that the TFP growth would average 0.8% over the rest of the 2010s.
The scenario results are tabulated in the second half of Table 6. The results are, not
surprisingly, quite favorable. Within a balanced macroeconomic policy environment sup-
ported by productivity advances, economic activity is invigorated. GDP growth accelerates
to above 7% on average, and with the imposition of the subsidy package at the rate granted
in historicalmagnitudes, achieves an expansion of employment by 1million 400 thousands,
bringing the unemployment rate to below 6% in 2013 (back to the 2000 level).
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The fact that even amodest set of productivity gain of about half of what is hypothesized
in the official documents could achieve such a strong and robust outcome, leads us to
underline once again the importance of structural macroeconomic fundamentals.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
In this study, I investigated the impact of the employment subsidies that Turkey had
introduced against the 2009 global crisis and the ongoing great recession. To this end, an
applied general equilibrium model was utilized to study the effects of the subsidy package
on the labor markets as well as overall macroeconomic aggregates and sectorial resource
allocation. The employment subsidization program was implemented via nine different
schemes. Data reveal that its fiscal costs averaged 0.9% per annum as a ratio to the GDP.
Counter-factual simulations of the analytical model indicate that the subsidization
program lead to an expansion of employment by 90 thousands in 2009, reaching to 230
thousands in 2013. The employment gains were associated with an expansion of the real
GDP by 8.1 billion TRY in fixed 2008 prices (with an additional 0.1% gain of real rate of
growth). On historical and across-country generalizations, this is evaluated as a meager
performance. I argued that thiswasdue to thedis-equilibriating and fragilemacroeconomic
environment surrounding the national economy. It is observed that, with its deteriorating
external balances and fragility, and the increased burden of interest on its burgeoning
foreign debt, Turkey had been trapped within the darkening conditions of the global great
recession. As a further complement of this deteriorating macro environment, Turkey had
increasingly suffered from a decline in its rate of productivity growth. Following 2006, TFP
rates had virtually stagnated and Turkey entered an era of volatile growth often dictated by
the availability of short term foreign finance capital. Against this background, the need for
administration of a stable and competitive real exchange rate policy and re-invigoration of
the domestic savings effort to maintain external balances are observed to be the sine qua
nons of the sustained growth for Turkey.
Based on these observations, my next research question was to ask, ‘what would be
the effectiveness of the existing subsidization program in an environment characterized
by more balanced macroeconomic conditions?’ Our simulations reveal that under such a
policy environment, the subsidy packages would enable an expansion of labor employment
by about threefolds to 568 thousands in 2013, with a decline of the unemployment rate to
8.5% (rather than 9.7%).
Finally, the modeling exercise introduced the positive role of enhanced productivity
gains. Under a new scenario, the balancedmacroeconomic environment is further comple-
mented with the hypothesis that Turkey could have maintained its historical productivity
gains (as was realized over 2002–2006) from 2011-onwards. Assuming a modest rate of
0.5% TFP growth over a stable macroeconomic environment enabled employment gains
of 1.4 million workers and the acceleration of GDP growth to 7% in returns to the subsidy
program.
All these observations are summarized succinctly in Figure 17 below. The figure portrays
the marginal gain in employment due to an additional 1 billion TRY subsidy expenditure.
This employment elasticity of subsidization reveals that by 2013 the program has generated
an additional employment of 29,766 workers per 1 billion TRY (in fixed 2008 prices). Per
contra, if the same policy package were introduced under amore balancedmacroeconomic
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environment, this elasticity would have been 73,170 workers. With the complementarities
hypothesized to be achieved from further productivity gains, this number could have
been increased to as much as 173,564 workers in the same year. Clearly, Turkey has
been missing an important opportunity against its otherwise quite generous employment
support program.
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Appendix 1. The data set
Themodel is built-around amulti-sectoral social accountingmatrix (SAM) of the Turkish economy
based on the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) 2002 Input Output Data. The 2002 I-O data
had been updated to 2008 using the national income statistics. The SAM data is further tabulated
from various other sources from the Ministry of Finance to obtain the fiscal flow data, and from the
Central Bank of TR to deduce statistics on balance of payments.
Sectoral employment is taken from TurkStat. Household Labor Force Surveys (HLFS) give
employment levels in detailed sectoral aggregation. This data is complemented by wage share data
of the International Labor Organization (2014) and were corrected for using the self-reported
household incomes as reported in the HLFS. Data on domestic and foreign debt and foreign trade
data are calculated from the balance of payments statistics of the TR Central Bank. All exogenous
flows of foreign capital and remittances are lumped under one item as net transfers to the private
household. (6.5% of the 2008 GDP).
The 2008 I/O Table and the Social Accounting Matrix are tabulated in the Appendix as Tables
A1 and A2 (Supplemental material). Sectoral employment data by labor types is summarized in the
Appendix Table A3 (Supplemental material). These data and the algebraic system of the model are
available from the author upon request.
